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This thesis proposes an integrated simulation tool to evaluate the impact of future in-space additive 
manufacturing (ISAM) and recycling technologies on the responsiveness of an on-orbit servicing (OOS) 
infrastructure to random failures of satellites distributed over an orbit. The considered OOS infrastructure is 
composed of a mothership and a servicer (i.e., daughtership); the mothership serves as a depot for spares, whereas 
the servicer travels with the spares to randomly failed satellites and provides a service. All satellites are assumed to 
be modularized, and thus the service type considered within the infrastructure is the replacement of a failed module 
with a new spare one. Additionally, an ISAM facility can be added to the mothership, which can scavenge material 
that makes up the failed module. This obtained feedstock from failed modules, along with raw material supplied 
from Earth, could be used to manufacture a new spare. The key parameters in this analysis include the technology 
level of ISAM, in terms of the types of material it can manufacture, and the scavenge rate, defined as the percent of 
material mass able to be recycled from the failed module to the new module.  The two metrics for evaluation are the 
required resupply launch mass to the mothership and the average waiting time of the satellites before it is serviced. 
Simulations results showed that the ISAM and recycling technology provides a large impact in terms of both 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, there has been increasing interest in developing on-orbit infrastructure systems to enable 
sustainable space exploration. Particularly, robotic on-orbit servicing (OOS) infrastructures that can provide repair 
services for failed satellites in orbit have been considered as a game-changing technology [1-5]. Furthermore, in-
space additive manufacturing (ISAM), using 3D printing technologies, and material recycling can be an impactful 
alternative to the current spacecraft maintenance scheme in which an overwhelming amount of logistics spares are 
carried on-board the spacecraft. The combination of these technologies is expected to have a profound impact on 
future satellite missions and their design. 
Advances in robotics and autonomy technology have made traditionally human-crew-involved OOS 
possible with fully robotic operation. The classical example of OOS was performed by the Space Shuttle crew on the 
Hubble Telescope. The completion of this mission showed that servicing the satellite on orbit could be less 
expensive than replacing it with a new one; however, the human element required for this mission still made it 
expensive and incurred high risk for the Space Shuttle crew. In response to this background, many programs have 
been investigating and demonstrating technologies for robotic OOS of satellites [6-8], and multiple studies have 
evaluated the benefits of robotic OOS technologies from both the provider’s and customer’s perspectives [2,9]. 
Beyond single robotic OOS missions, recent studies have also proposed that a permanent OOS infrastructure with a 
mothership and a servicer (i.e., daughtership) can provide responsive servicing to the random failures of satellites 
distributed over an orbit [5]. Furthermore, the potential impact of OOS has been enhanced even further by a recently 
proposed modularized satellite concept by DARPA’s Satlet project [10], where a satellite is composed of a set of 
modularized replaceable units each of which provide a fraction of the overall function of a complete satellite. This 
satellite modularization concept would allow for easy replacement and scavenging of components that could be 
repurposed for future satellites.  
Meanwhile, investigation into the use of ISAM and its benefits on mission logistics reduction are 
underway. In 2014, NASA presented its “Road to Realizing In-Space Manufacturing” to the National Research 
Council (NRC) [11], which summarizes the state of the art and future possibilities of ISAM. One successful example 
of ISAM is that Made In Space has successfully tested 3D printing on-board the International Space Station (ISS) 
through the 3D printing in Zero-G ISS Technology Demonstration [12]. It is envisioned that Made In Space’s 3D 
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printer will have the ability to 3D print plastic and composite logistics components aboard the ISS using a Fused 
Deposition Modeling (FDM) technique. According to the demonstration, approximately 28.6% of replaceable parts 
aboard the ISS are plastics and composites. In addition to the ISS, other studies have been conducted showing the 
impact ISAM could provide for deep space missions [13,14]. It has been shown that even limited AM capability to 
produce replacement components for the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) system during a notional 
Mars campaign can dramatically reduce the required ELCS logistics spares for the campaign. Thus, the possible 
benefits in required spare reduction can be inferred as the technology continues to develop. Future possibilities that 
ISAM has to offer include ISAM of metals and electronics, as well as recycling feedstock for future use. NASA has 
begun development of its Electron Beam Freeform Fabrication (EBF) rapid metal deposition process that, although 
not yet tested in space, has been tested in a microgravity environment [15]. NASA considered EBF as a viable 
process capable of printing metals for component fabrication such as aluminum due to its high energy efficiency and 
ease of handling. For manufacturing of electronics, the University of Texas El-Paso (UTEP) developed their multi3D 
printer that utilizes a Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) process in which electronics are integrated into the 3D 
printed structure [16]. This process has yet to be tested in space either; however, it has been used to manufacture 
subsystems aboard UTEP’s Trailblazer CubeSat with integrated electronics on Earth, which was then launched into 
orbit in 2013. NASA has also begun to investigate the development and feasibility of a multimaterial fabrication 
laboratory (FabLab) that could be deployed on the ISS in the early 2020’s [17]. The FabLab will move the space 
industry further along in changing the historical paradigm of sole resupply of necessary materials used in space from 
Earth. 
In addition to these promising manufacturing technologies, there are currently many projects underway that 
evaluate the design of an ISM system that can fabricate and robotically assemble large structures on-orbit. In 
particular, the Archinaut In Space Manufacturing and Assembly system and SpiderFab projects have investigated 
the fabrication and deployment of custom space structures scalable from small satellite buses to large geostationary 
platforms [18,19] using AM technology and robotic assembly. Trusselator is another project underway that seeks to 
fabricate and assemble composite truss structures on-orbit to enable construction of large spacecraft components 
such as high gain antennas [20]. 
One of the critical aspects of AM technology that makes it so appealing, especially for manufacturing of 
space components, is its ability to recycle material. When a component or structure fails, the material from the failed 
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component can be scavenged and used for manufacturing of a new part. Because of the possible impact this could 
have on reducing dependency on Earth, NASA is currently funding Tethers Unlimited to develop a sustainable In-
Space Manufacturing Ecosystem called Positrusion that will demonstrate recycling of plastic 3D printer materials on 
the ISS [21]. 
Due to the surge in technology demonstration of additive manufacturing (AM) and recycling of space 
structures either on Earth or in space along with the possibility to repair failed satellites on orbit, it has become 
increasingly important to develop a framework to evaluate the impact of ISAM and recycling technologies on the 
performance of an OOS infrastructure. The performance metrics of interest include the required resupply launch 
mass to the mothership and the average waiting time of the satellites before it is serviced (i.e., responsiveness of the 
service). This problem can become complex and challenging because the OOS infrastructure contains multiple 
interacting elements such as a mothership platform used to store spare modules, a robotic servicer used for 
delivering the replacement modules, an AM/recycling facility on-board the mothership, as well as a launch vehicle 
that resupplies spares and feedstock to the mothership. Furthermore, assuming a first-come-first-served policy, when 
there are multiple satellites waiting to be serviced, a new failure needs to wait until all existing failures are serviced 
before receiving the service; thus, evaluation of the waiting time before servicing needs to take this queueing effect 
into consideration. Additionally, due to the randomness of the failures, there is a (hopefully small) probability where 
failures concentrate around a certain time resulting in the mothership depot being depleted. This situation would 
significantly impact the delay in the waiting time, and thus also needs to be considered in the analysis, adding 
further complexity to the problem.   
In order to resolve these challenges, this paper proposes an integrated simulation model to evaluate the 
impact of having emerging technologies such as ISAM and material recycling for a complex responsive OOS 
infrastructure and demonstrated it with a case study for servicing of a set of modularized geostationary satellites. 
The developed integrated simulation framework considers the failure of satellite components, replacement of the 
modules, AM/scavenging of modules, and resupply of the mothership platform. The key parameters in the analysis 
include the technology level of ISAM and the scavenge rate. The technology level of ISAM is defined by the 
materials that ISAM can print: plastic/composite, metal, and electronics. The impact of each technology level is 
evaluated in the analysis. Additionally, the scavenge rate is defined as the percent of material mass able to be 
recycled from the failed module to the new module. The two metrics for evaluation are the required resupply launch 
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mass to the mothership and the average waiting time of the satellites before it is serviced. The simulations were 
performed to demonstrate this simulation model, and the results showed the effectiveness of various technology 
levels of ISAM in improving the resupply launch mass and the waiting time before service.  
We expect the developed integrated simulation model will be an important step to facilitate the design and 
evaluation of on-orbit servicing infrastructure with emerging ISAM/recycling technology. In addition, the results 







































CHAPTER 2: SERVICING INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL 
 
This section introduces the servicing infrastructure model developed in this analysis. The servicing architecture 
modeled in this paper contains up to five distinct elements: the launch vehicle, robotic servicer, mothership platform, 
modularized GEO satellites, and the Additive Manufacturing System (AMS). The mothership, with a docked robotic 
service vehicle, and modularized satellites are assumed to be in GEO. The robotic servicer obtains a replacement spare 
module from the mothership and travels to the failed satellite to perform servicing operations. The launch vehicle 
provides spare modules and feedstock to the mothership as its supply depletes throughout the mothership lifecycle. 
Figure 1 illustrates the general Concept of Operations (ConOps) of the servicing infrastructure this paper assumes. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Servicing architecture concept of operations diagram 
The contents of the mothership define the difference between the two servicing infrastructures of interest, referred 
to for the rest of this paper as the Baseline Infrastructure and AM Infrastructure. The differences between contents 

















Baseline and AM Infrastructure Overviews 
For the baseline infrastructure with no AM capability, when a module fails on a satellite within the infrastructure, 
the robotic servicer receives spare modules from the spare module depot based on a first-come-first-served basis. The 
servicer performs a phasing maneuver to the first failed satellite and replaces the failed module with the new module. 
The servicer then either returns to the mothership to wait for another failure or proceeds to the next failed satellite for 
service. Once the servicer returns to the mothership, it discards the failed module and its components. Additionally, 
once the spare depot is depleted over time, a launch vehicle filled with the necessary spare modules to resupply the 
spare module depot is sent to the mothership. A schematic describing the key parameters and interaction between the 
baseline infrastructure models is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2 Overview of baseline infrastructure model. The list in each block defines the key considerations. 
For the AM OOS infrastructure, the flow of commodities within the infrastructure is quite different. Initially, the 
servicer operations are similar to the baseline infrastructure. However, in contrast to the baseline infrastructure, when 
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a module fails, a signal is sent to the mothership depot indicating whether or not that specific module can be 
manufactured based on the current capability of the on-orbit AMS. If the module can be additively manufactured, the 
AMS retrieves the necessary feedstock from the spare feedstock depot to begin manufacturing the replacement. Once 
the servicer returns to the mothership, instead of discarding the failed module, it places the failed module within the 
on-board AMS. Feedstock from the failed module is then scavenged based on the specified scavenge rate of that 
particular material. The scavenge rate is defined as the percentage of material able to be retrieved and recycled for 
printing of the new replacement module. Once the feedstock is scavenged, it is used to resupply the spare feedstock 
depot for use in future manufacturing of failed modules. In this case, the launch vehicle not only resupplies the 
motherships spare module depot, but also contains spare feedstock material to resupply the feedstock depot. The AM 
OOS infrastructure schematic illustrating the flow of commodities as well as the sizing parameters of each model is 
shown in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3 Overview of AM OOS infrastructure model. The list in each block defines the key considerations. 
The remaining parts within this section are used to describe the models of each element and how they differ within 
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Launch Vehicle Model 
Several assumptions are made to model the launch vehicle operations. There are four main parameters related to 
the model: launch frequency, predicted success rate, travel time to the mothership, and maximum capacity of resupply 
modules and feedstock. The launch vehicle resupply opportunity frequency is assumed to a constant time increment 
derived from various launch vehicles historical data [22]. At each resupply opportunity, the launch vehicle model 
assesses the current supply of spare modules and feedstock aboard the mothership. If the supply of any commodity is 
below a specified threshold, the launch vehicle is loaded with enough modules and feedstock to fully resupply the 
mothership depots up to their full capacity. So, even if only one module type is below the threshold, when the resupply 
event is triggered, the launch vehicle completely resupplies all modules and feedstock to the mothership. 
Due to complexity of sending launch vehicles to orbit, the launch success rate of particular vehicles based on 
historical data [22] is incorporated into the model. The model assumes that if a launch failure occurs either on the 
launchpad or on-orbit, all resupply modules and feedstock are lost. Thus, the mothership must wait for the next 
resupply opportunity. 
The travel time of the launch vehicle to the mothership is modeled in two simplified phases. For ascent to orbit, 
the phase duration of a particular launch vehicle is assumed constant and can be derived from the launchers user guide 
[23] based on the desired ascent altitude. Once the ascent phase is completed, the orbital transfer from the current 
altitude to the motherships current position in geostationary orbit is modeled as a Hohmann transfer. The total travel 
time to the mothership is the sum of time to complete these two phases.   
Finally, the launch vehicle maximum capacity has been sized to meet a certain maximum module and feedstock 
demand. In this way, the mothership maximum capacity does not exceed the launch vehicle capabilities. Thus, the 
launch vehicle is always able to meet the necessary resupply demands of the mothership. However, if the resupply 
demand of the mothership is less than the launch vehicle capacity, only the necessary quantity of commodities is sent 
to the mothership. 
In terms of comparing the baseline infrastructure with the AM OOS infrastructure, the launch vehicle only differs 
in the type of commodities it delivers. In the former, only modules are a part of the resupply events. In the latter, 




 The mothership is assumed to be placed in GEO and contains various critical elements of the baseline 
infrastructure, including the robotic servicer docking port, launch vehicle docking port and spare module depot. For 
the AM OOS infrastructure, the mothership depot contains an on-board AMS and a spare feedstock depot. The critical 
sizing parameters of the mothership include the maximum commodity capacity and manufacturing equipment mass 
(if needed). Other important parameters of the mothership are the commodity threshold before resupply is requested 
during a launch vehicle resupply opportunity and the initial commodity supply at the beginning of the simulation. It 
is also assumed that the mothership is constantly supplied with fuel for stationkeeping and attitude control during 
operation, which is not affected by initial mothership sizing. Thus, the propellant requirements for these operations 
throughout the mothership’s lifecycle are not tracked within the model. Refueling procedures and propellant 
consumption of the mothership could be added to the model in future work. 
AMS Model 
  For the baseline infrastructure, the AMS is not modeled. However, the AMS is the key component of the AM 
OOS infrastructure. It is assumed that the main sizing parameter of the AMS is the manufacturing system’s mass for 
each specific technology. The most important functional parameter of the AMS includes the time required to print 
each module, which most likely differ depending on the material and printer. The time required to manufacture a part 
depends on many factors such as geometric complexity and precision. However, a simplified first order manufacturing 
time model can be implemented based on the module size [14]. In this analysis, the approximate manufacturing time 
is calculated based on the specified manufacturing system’s volumetric feed rate and the total module volume. Thus, 
the main AM technologies parameters required to accurately model each process in this analysis are the system mass 
and feedrate. The manufacturing time of each module is presented in the Module Model section once the volume of 
each module is established.  
 To initiate AM capability, the model gives the user freedom to define which modules can and cannot be 
manufactured on orbit. If one or more modules can be manufactured, the user then defines the corresponding 
manufacturing system mass, feedrate, and feedstock mass used to manufacture this particular module. For 
simplification, AM capability of a particular module is assumed to mean that that entire module can be manufactured 
by the AMS using only feedstock.  
 The initial feedstock mass and depot capacity are established by ensuring the total mothership mass is kept 
constant. This is calculated by subtracting the additional AMS mass from the spare depot mass in the baseline 
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infrastructure. For example, if in the baseline infrastructure the mothership contains 100 kg of a spare module and the 
mass of the AMS used to print this module is 50 kg, then in the AM infrastructure, there would be 50 kg of feedstock 
and no spare modules aboard the mothership. 
 The model also allows the user to define the scavenge rate for a particular module. The scavenge rate is 
defined as the percentage of feedstock material that can be recycled from the failed module. For example, if the 
scavenge rate is 0%, a new module has to be manufactured from entirely new feedstock aboard the mothership. If the 
scavenge rate is 100%, the entire failed module can be repurposed into the new module, creating a closed loop 
recycling process that never require feedstock resupply from Earth for that particular material or module. The seized 
feedstock is assumed to be instantly placed in the feedstock depot and available for use in manufacturing spares. Thus, 
the scavenge rate does not contribute the manufacturing time of each module. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
retrieving of the necessary feedstock from the feedstock depot by the AMS is instantaneous. Similarly, AMS 
operations to place the newly manufactured module into the spare module depot after the specified module 
manufacturing time has elapsed is negligible and does not contribute to the module manufacturing time. 
Robotic Servicer Model 
The robotic servicer is the most important component of both the baseline OOS and AM OOS infrastructures 
regarding their responsiveness to satellite failure. Their trajectories must be accurately modeled to ensure the 
responsiveness is captured with high fidelity. In this paper, the servicer, which is docked to the mothership, and all 
modularized satellites are placed in GEO. Thus, the servicer trajectory and rendezvous operations to a satellite are 
modeled as a phasing maneuver.  
Before the phasing maneuver is discussed, a few assumptions must be mentioned. First, it is assumed that the 
servicer is refueled before each mothership departure.. Second, it is assumed that the loading of spare modules is 
instantaneous.  . Finally, the servicer propellant capacity is assumed greater than the propellant mass required to 
perform the most mass expensive servicing operation. This means servicer propellant capacity would never be a 
limiting factor in the waiting time before service of satellites.  
 Phasing maneuver-based rendezvous is a two-impulse trajectory between two different positions in the 
same circular orbit. Once the servicer receives a signal that a replacement must be completed, the servicer begins the 
phasing maneuver immediately. The travel time is dependent on only the initial relative angle, ∆𝜃𝑜, between the 
target satellite and servicer.  
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 First, to begin calculating the characteristics of each phasing maneuver, a new angle 𝛼 is defined as 𝛼 =
2𝜋 − Δ𝜃𝑜 for Δ𝜃𝑜 > 0 and 𝛼 = −Δ𝜃𝑜 for Δ𝜃𝑜 ≤ 0. In addition, two parameters k1 and k2 are defined corresponding 
to the number of complete orbits the servicer and target, respectively, make before rendezvous is completed. The 
travel time from the servicer point of view is  




where 𝑎 is the semi-major axis of the phasing orbit, which is an unknown. From the point of view of the target 
satellite, the travel time is 




where 𝑟 is the radius of the circular orbit of the target. Equation (2) accounts for the fact that the servicer completes 
𝑘1 revolutions on its phasing orbit and the satellite performs 𝑘2 revolutions on its circular orbit before rendezvous and 
docking. In our analysis introduced later in this paper, values for 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 were chosen such that the travel time is 
minimized without the phasing orbit crossing Earth’s radius. Note that this paper focuses on the responsiveness of the 
servicer, and therefore travel time was prioritized over Δ𝑉 requirements. 
 The servicer utilizes a first-come-first-served policy. When the servicer finds multiple failures in the queue and 
sufficient spares in the depot before its departure, it would carry the corresponding number of modules (as long as that 
is smaller than its maximum capacity), and provide the services in the order of the failures. If the number of failures 
in the queue is larger than the servicer’s maximum module capacity, it would make multiple trips.  
Note that there are several cases that can prevent the servicer from departing immediately after the failure. The 
first case is that the servicer is currently completing another service at another satellite. The second case is that the 
servicer is already in orbit, not docked to the mothership, and does not have the correct failed module in its payload 
bay. Third, if the mothership supply of that particular module is depleted, the servicer must wait to complete this 





Key Analysis Metrics 
Although the developed simulation model is general enough to consider various metrics, this subsection introduces 
how we define the two metrics that this paper is interested in. The defined metrics are used to illustrate the benefits 
ISAM technology.  
The first metric is the total resupply launch mass over the simulation period. This is calculated as the total module 
mass plus total feedstock mass resupplied to the mothership by the launch vehicle. It is predicted that ISAM should 
reduce the total required resupply launch mass to the mothership due to the ability to recycle of feedstock mass from 
failed satellites.  
The second parameter used to analyze the AM OOS infrastructure compared to the baseline infrastructure is the 
average modular satellite waiting time before service. The satellite waiting time before service completion is 
calculated by 
 𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑡𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒  (4) 
where 𝑡𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒 is the total time before the servicer departs for the failed satellite, 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the time it takes for the 
servicer to complete the phasing maneuver from either another satellite or the mothership, and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒  is the time the 
servicer takes to complete the replacement operation. The replacement time is a set constant parameter for both 
infrastructures presented in Table 4. Once this value is calculated for each module failure upon a specific satellite, the 
average waiting time for each satellite is calculated. Then, the average waiting time of all satellites is calculated by 
averaging the waiting time of each satellite over the simulations. 
OOS Model Assumptions Summary 
 Several assumptions were implemented in the development of both the baseline and AM OOS infrastructures that 
could impact the results presented in the following case study. However, since the model is flexible to change and 
updates in technology, the results can be easily updated as more information is obtained. The following is a list of the 
major assumptions implemented when developing this model: 
• The servicer design in this model is high level, considering only the dry mass and specific impulse of the 
servicer to calculate the required propellant needed to complete the phasing maneuver. Servicer propellant 
capacity is not considered so it is never a limiting factor in module service waiting time. However, the model 
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does calculate the required propellant mass to complete each mission, so the required servicer propellant is 
known. 
• Although current processes such as EBF utilize low precision manufacturing systems, it is assumed that the 
manufacturing processes modeled within the AMS have evolved over time from their current state and 
obtained the necessary precision to accurately manufacture quality parts that meet the standards of current 
components manufactured terrestrially. Thus, when a module is manufactured on-orbit, it will have the same 
failure rate as if the module were manufactured on Earth, even for high precision parts such as reactions 
wheels. It is understood that the current capabilities of ISAM and recycling technologies do not have this 
required precision now, but this paper is evaluating future technologies (i.e. modularized satellites, ISAM, 
etc…). If it is desired, the model can be updated to include technology precision constraints. For example, 
since a reaction wheel is a component that requires high precision manufacturing, if the manufacturing 
technology is unable to print this part to the necessary precision, then the AMS cannot manufacture that 
module. 
• This model currently assesses the impact of future AM/recycling technologies for modularized satellites. 
Modularized satellites were implemented into the model because their design, which is more conducive to 
replacing failed parts, is consider be one of the most feasible options when implementing AM/recycling into 
an autonomous satellite servicing infrastructure. Currently the model assumes that each individual model can 
only be manufactured using one material. Thus, the impact presented in the following case study comparing 
the baseline and AM architectures will be due to the ability to recycle material, not just manufacture the 
module. In the future, the model could be updated to allow multiple modules to be printed by the same 










CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY 
 
This section presents the cases analyzed in this paper using the OOS framework. The first section describes the 
evolution of available ISAM technologies, why these particular technologies were chosen in that order, and their 
corresponding model sizing parameters. The next section illustrates the design of each of the individual modules, the 
failure model of each module based on its design, and when that particular module can be manufactured by the AMS 
based on the assumed available technology. Then, the modularized satellite model is defined based on the functionality 
of each module. Finally, the remaining parameters required for simulation are presented. 
Note that we recognize that some of the input parameters are based on our best estimates and prediction of future 
technology development, and we do not claim that our simulation results exactly match with the actual flight 
performance; instead, the contribution of this paper is the developed integrated simulation framework, which can 
accommodate any parameter values as more accurate data become available. 
Modeling of Predicted ISAM Technology 
 Three AM technologies were assessed in this paper based on the current and predicted future ISAM 
technology. The first AM technology, which is currently the only process ever to be tested and used in space, is AM 
of plastics and composites.  Thus, the AMS was sized using Made In Space’s 3D printer specifications, seen in Table 
1. Because Made In Space does not readily provide their 3D printer’s volumetric feed rate, it was approximated as the 
feedrate of the FDM maxum printer [24]. This is a viable assumption since Made In Space’s 3D printer also utilizes 
FDM technology aboard the ISS. Additionally, as is the case with all future technologies mentioned, we assumed that 
the printer has the capability to print with any plastic/composite material, which is determined by the component 
materials within the module. This is also a reasonable assumption since, although not yet available, Made In Space is 
in the process of expanding the capability of their current technology aboard the ISS to print with a greater variety of 
materials.  
Once ISAM of plastics and composites is established aboard the AMS, the next technology predicted to be 
available for ISAM is 3D printing of metals. The most viable up and coming technology for ISAM of metals looks to 
be NASA Langley’s Electron Beam Freeform Fabrication (EBF) process since, although not yet tested aboard the ISS, 
it has been tested in a microgravity environment. To model this technology, previous test information provided by 
NASA [15] was utilized. NASA’s EBF feedrate has demonstrated deposition rates of 5.50 – 41.67 cm3/min. To be 
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conservative, the slowest feedrate was used in this analysis. The mass of the EBF 3D printer was not provided in the 
literature, so it was assumed to be the same mass as Made In Space’s 3D printer since it is still the sole representation 
of a working 3D printer in space. These values can also be found in Table 1. 
The final AM technology modeled in this analysis is the 3D printing of structures with integrated electronics. In 
2013, The University of Texas El-Paso (UTEP) used a Stereolithography (SL) process to fabricate the dielectric 
structure of a subsystem in their CubeSat Trailblazer, which launched into orbit later that year. With the experience 
gained from this project on how 3D printed integrated electronic structures perform in space, UTEP has developed 
their multi3D system, which uses a modified FDM fabrication process to make up for the low level of durability found 
using SL [16]. Due to UTEP’s experience using this process to 3D print subsystems of CubeSats and putting them 
into orbit, the multi3D specifications is used to model integrated 3D printed structures with embedded electronics. 
Although this process has not been tested for printing in microgravity, it can be assumed to be the most practical 
process to be used for ISAM of integrated electronics in the future due to the use of FDM, the same process used by 
Made In Space’s 3D printer. Because of these similarities, and lack of any other historical data, the feedrate for 
modeling this process was matched with that of the plastic and composite model, shown in Table 1. The 3D printer 
mass was matched with Made In Space’s current 3D printer mass, also shown in Table 1.  
 Table 1 presents the predicted practical evolution of ISAM technology, starting with plastics and composites and 
ending with Embedded Electronics. As technology capabilities are added, it is assumed that the new manufacturing 
system mass with the corresponding specifications above is added to the AMS aboard the mothership before the 
simulation begins.  
Table 1 AM Technology Model Key Parameter Assumptions 
Technology/Material Mass, kg Feedrate, cm3/min 
Plastic/Composite 45 1.50 
Metals 45 5.50 
Embedded Electronics 45 1.50 
Module Model 
The module definition in this paper closely resembles that of DARPA’s current Satlet as part of the Phoenix 
Program [10]. Each module captures certain functions of a satellite that, when docked with other modules, create a 
fully functional modularized satellite. To benefit from previous failure data of geostationary communication satellites, 
the components that make up the modules were derived from the GEO communication satellite failure study conducted 
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by Haga et al. [25]. Utilizing these subsystem components to define each module provides a convenient way to define 
the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of each module, creating an accurate representation of their probable failure 
rates within the simulation tool.  
Before the MTBF of each module is established, however, the components within each module must be defined. 
Four different types of modules were identified in this paper. Instead of being comprised of components categorized 
by functionality, the component composition was defined by the material used to manufacture each component. This 
innovative definition could lead to a much more convenient process when replacing each module in that, when a 
module fails based on its MTBF, the entire replacement structure and its components can be manufactured in space if 
that specific technology is available.  
The different modules and their corresponding components can be found in Table 2. Module 1 contains the reaction 
wheel system for attitude control and a radiator for thermal control of the entire satellite. Reaction wheels are 
commonly manufactured from the composite material urethane, since it is not affected by Earth’s magnetic field. 
Additionally, current research is being conducted by the University of Massachusetts on the development and testing 
of a radiator made of carbon fiber [26]. Because both of these components are made of a composite material, it was 
assumed that the entirety of module 1 can be manufactured with the plastic/composite 3D printer technology. Module 
2 contains the thruster system and fuel tank required for station keeping, each assumed to be made of aluminum.  
Being manufactured with metal, it was assumed that this would be the next module available for manufacturing in 
space using NASA Langley’s EBF process. Module 3 is comprised of the Attitude Determination and Control System 
(ADCS) sensors, the Telemetry, Tracking & Command sensors, and the communication beam and antenna. The 
manufacturing of this module is modeled by UTEP’s multi3D system, an FDM process that prints structures with 
integrated electronics. Based on the predicted future technology, this was assumed to be the third available process 
for ISAM. Finally, Module 4 is the power system module, containing the solar array and battery. Because of the 
expected complexity in manufacturing of solar arrays and reliable batteries for power storage using AM, we assumed 
that this module would not be able to be manufactured by the AMS even after all other technologies are available. 
To complete the module and corresponding ISAM definition, the manufacturing time of each module must be 
established. We assumed that each module structure matches the mass and dimension restrictions of a standard 6U 
CubeSat. As such, each module is restricted to a 10cm x 20cm x 30cm volume and be a maximum mass of 12 kg. As 
stated in the previous section, the manufacturing time of each module was determined by the maximum volume of 
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each module times the assumed feedrate of the corresponding technology. It is well understood that using the 
maximum volume of the module would overestimate the actual operation volume. However, due to enormous 
uncertainties in future ISAM technologies, we aimed to be as conservative as possible when developing the AM 
model. Table 2 shows the expected manufacturing time of each module. 
Table 2 Module Definition and Corresponding ISAM Technology 






Module 1 Plastic/Composite Reaction wheel, 
Radiator 
12 6000 67 
Module 2 Metals Thruster, Fuel Tank 12 6000 18 




Beam and Antenna 
12 6000 67 
Module 4 None Solar Array, Battery, 
Distribution systems 
12 6000 n/a 
 
Note that this paper is not claiming that these technologies are currently available for its assumed function. 
However, based on the current ISAM technology and current terrestrial research being conducted, it was predicted 
that this could be a possible evolution of ISAM of satellite components. It is hoped that the results in this paper and 
future work could pave the way for future AM development of these components, possibly encouraging commonality 
in the materials used to manufacture certain satellite components within the same module.  
With the defined modules, the MTBF of each module was derived based on the component failure data [25] of 
GEO communication satellites. In this paper, the probability of module failure was modeled as a Poisson process, with 
the assumption that the next failure is independent of the previous one. The Poisson process parameter was set equal 
to the average failure rate deduced from the data collected in the failure scorecards. Although the infrastructure model 
can account for major and minor failures of satellites, we are only interested in satellite failures that require full module 
replacement. Thus, only the fatal failure rates of the components were considered. 
 The fatal MTBF for each module is illustrated in Table 3. Because each module is comprised of multiple 
components with different MTBF’s, the following property of the exponential probability distribution can be utilized 
to find the total MTBF of the module: the sum of independent random variables modeled by an exponential distribution 
can be modeled by an exponential distribution function with its parameter equal to the sum of the parameter of the 
summed random variables.  For the aforementioned module definition, however, each module has only one component 
that drives the fatal MTBF of the overall system. Thus, the exponential property described above was not needed for 
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the case examined in this paper. Although not needed, this property illustrates the flexibility of the OOS model, 
allowing the user to redefine each module component composition for future case studies if desired. 
Table 3 Module MTBF data [25] 
Module MTBF, years 
Module 1 11.18 
Module 2 1.00 
Module 3 10.00 
Module 4 5.83 
 
A key assumption was made in the MTBF of module 3. The scorecard data used to derive the failure rates showed 
no fatal failures for the components within module 3. Without a failure rate of a module, the corresponding technology 
cannot be analyzed. Thus, in order to evaluate the AM benefits of the embedded electronic technology for module 3, 
a MTBF of ten years was assigned to the module. This particular failure rate was assigned since the total simulation 
time, as to be introduced later, was set to ten years. This means during the simulation, each module 3 fails at a rate of 
once per simulation. Because the electronic components within module 3 had frequent major and minor failures, the 
possibility that one of these failures causing satellite failure is reasonable. Also, considering the fact that AM 
technology could in the future allow for the development of less reliable parts since they can be replaced in orbit, the 
above assumption was deemed viable. However, this should be considered when analyzing the results presented in 
section IV. 
Modeling of Modularized Satellites 
The modularized satellites and mothership was placed in GEO in our analysis. Without loss of generality, the 
initial true anomaly of the mothership was set to 0, with the satellites initially spreading out evenly among 360o 
depending on the number of satellites in the infrastructure.  
For simplicity, all the modeled satellites were assumed to be identical. The satellite design in terms of the quantity 
of each module was determined as follows: First, it was assumed that only one module 3 is required to supply all the 
electronics necessary for satellite operation. Second, it was assumed that one module 4 can supply enough power to 
supply itself, the radiator for thermal control in module 1, and one additional module. Additionally, the radiator in 
module 1 can provide adequate thermal control of itself, the corresponding power module, and one additional module. 
Thus, module 1 and module 4 work together to provide the power and thermal control for the satellite. For every 
module 1 needed for thermal control, one module 4 is required for power supply. Third, it was assumed that the 
thrusters in module 2 can support station keeping requirements for a total of 4 modules, or 48 kg. Similarly, it was 
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assumed that the reaction wheel system in module 1 can perform the required attitude control and slewing maneuvers 
for 3 total modules.  
Based on these requirements, the quantity of each module that comprise the modularized satellites was determined 
as follows: Four of module 1, three of module 2, one of module 3, and four of module 4. All of the above requirements 
described for satellite design are met or exceeded. Since there is only a total of 12 modules in this setting, there are 
redundant reaction wheel systems as a part of each satellite based on the assumed reaction wheel sizing. However, 
this is required due to the radiator thermal control and power system assumptions. 
Simulation Settings 
This section summarizes the specific settings of both the baseline and AM OOS infrastructure simulations. Table 
4 illustrates the key common simulation parameters for both servicing architectures. Table 5 shows the parameters 
specific to the baseline infrastructure and Table 6 shows the parameters specific to the AM OOS infrastructure. 
 
Table 4 Parameters common to both OOS infrastructures 
Parameter Value 
Simulation time 10 years 
Total mass of servicer 500 kg 
Maximum module capacity of servicer 4 
Launch frequency 617 hours 
Probability of launch success 0.88 
Launch vehicle ascent time 1584 seconds 
Ascent phase concluding altitude 180 km 
Servicer replacement time 4 hours 
Servicer Dry Mass 100 kg 




Table 5 Parameters specific to baseline infrastructure 
Parameter Value 
Mothership module capacity for each 
type 
15 modules 
Mothership module threshold before 
resupply for each type 
5 modules 
Initial number of each module type on 
mothership 
15 modules 




















Table 6 Parameters specific to AM OOS infrastructure 
Parameter Value 
Mothership module capacity for each type of 
module that cannot be 3D printed 
15 modules 
Mothership module threshold before resupply for 
each type of module that cannot be 3D printed 
5 modules 
Initial number of each module type on mothership 
that cannot be 3D printed 
15 modules 
Initial number of each module type on mothership 
that CAN be 3D printed 
5 modules 
Mothership feedstock mass capacity per AM 
technology 
75 kg 
Threshold feedstock mass per AM technology 25 kg 
Initial feedstock mass capacity per AM technology 75 kg 
Scavenge rate per AM technology varies, 0% - 100% 
Maximum resupply launch capacity 720 kg 
 
For the AM OOS infrastructure settings, it is important to note the changes in the simulation settings as ISAM 
technologies are added to the AMS. As seen in Table 6, when a module cannot be manufactured, its capacity, initial 
value, and threshold are the same in both architectures. Obviously, for these modules, there is no corresponding 
feedstock on board the AMS since it is not available to be used. When a particular technology becomes available, the 
settings for that module change. The mothership initially contains five AM modules and 75 kg of corresponding 
feedstock. For this case, the mothership is only resupplied with feedstock when it goes below the threshold throughout 
the simulation. When an additional ISAM technology is added and analyzed, the mothership would initially contain 
five of the corresponding module type as well, along with 75 kg of its corresponding feedstock.  
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The initial condition and depot capacity values of feedstock were chosen since they keep the total mothership mass 
constant with the baseline infrastructure. In other words, the total module, feedstock, and AMS mass in the AM OOS 
infrastructure was kept equal to the total module mass in the baseline infrastructure. This allows the analysis to 
accurately depict the benefits in ISAM technology without inducing bias with increased resupply mass for either the 


























CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section illustrates the significant results derived from baseline and AM OOS infrastructures. The first 
subsection is a scavenge rate sensitivity analysis for the predicted ISAM technology evolution. The second subsection 
shows the sensitivity of the key metrics to increases in the number of satellites within the infrastructures. The third 
subsection demonstrates how this OOS tool can evaluate the impact ISAM technology can have without recycling 
capabilities 
ISAM Technology and Scavenge Rate Sensitivity Analysis 
This first analysis was performed to quantify the savings in resupply launch mass that ISAM technology, and in 
particular the ability to recycle material, could provide. Intuitively, it makes sense that being able to scavenge material 
from failed modules and recycle that material to build new modules should reduce the necessary resupply mass from 
Earth. However, the magnitude of this benefit needs to be established. It is important to note that the resupply launch 
mass calculations presented in these sections represent the total module and feedstock mass supplied to the mothership 
from Earth. Propellant mass is considered separately from the total launch mass model because it is not needed to 
understand the impact of AM OOS infrastructure. Although propellant consumption by the servicer and mothership 
is a key contributor to total launch mass, since the number of required resupply launches to the mothership and replacer 
servicing missions would be similar for the baseline and AM OOS infrastructures over time, the required propellant 
mass would also be the same. Additionally, the propellant required for mothership station keeping will also be the 
same over time for both cases since the mothership mass is kept as the same. Therefore, for clarify in comparison 
between the baseline and AM OOS infrastructure cases, the launch mass results shown later only include required 
module and feedstock mass. If desired, the model could be quickly updated so that propellant is included in launch 
mass. 
 Additionally, this paper is also interested in analyzing the AM OOS architecture average waiting time compared 
to the baseline architecture. Although the AM OOS infrastructure has the ability to recycle material, possibly leading 
to reduced time where the mothership is depleted of a particular module type, there is an added element of 
manufacturing time that could require the servicer’s waiting time before it begins its phasing maneuver to be greater 
than the baseline infrastructure.  
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For this sensitivity analysis, five modularized satellites were initially placed at equally spaced true anomalies 
around GEO. First, the baseline infrastructure was simulated to establish the baseline analysis metrics that would be 
compared to the AM OOS architecture. Then, per the predicted ISAM technology evolution mentioned earlier, the 
AM OOS infrastructure was first simulated with the ability to manufacture plastics and composites. Recall that this 
means for this case that only module 1 can be manufactured in space, while all other modules must be resupplied from 
Earth. Also, the launch vehicle does not resupply the mothership with spares of module 1, but with plastic feedstock. 
Next, the metal AM technology was added to the infrastructure and simulation to view how increases in 
ISAM/recycling technology capability affects the key analysis metrics. Because we are evaluating ISAM/recycling 
evolution, we also assumed that there is still a plastic 3D printer aboard the AMS.  Once again, this means that there 
are two AM systems within the AMS: a plastic 3D printer and metal 3D printer. Module 1 can be manufactured using 
the plastic printer and module 2 using the metal printer. Finally, the embedded electronics technology was added to 
the architecture. In this case, module 1, module 2, and module 3 can be manufactured in space. In addition, to analyze 
the benefit of the  scavenge rate on resupply launch mass reduction, simulations at each technology level were run for 
rates of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%.  
Due to the randomness in the simulations stemming from the MTBF probability models, each scenario for each 
technology at the different scavenge rates were simulated over a time span of 10 years 50 separate times. The average 
resupply launch mass over 10 years and total waiting time were then averaged over the  simulations Throughout the 
50 simulations over 10 years, if there are 5 serviceable satellites, there are approximately 10,500 servicing missions 
and 700 resupply launches, which should be sufficiently large sample sizes to accurately calculate the key metrics 
presented in this analysis. A figure illustrating the reduction in average resupply launch mass over 10 years for each 
scenario is shown in Fig. 4. The baseline infrastructure case (no ISAM/recycling technology) point is also included 






Fig. 4 Evolution of ISAM/recycling technologies at various scavenge rates and their effect on resupply launch 
mass 
In addition, the servicer propellant requirements were calculated. The average propellant consumption over all 
servicer missions was approximately 132 kg with a standard deviation of 10 kg. This is the same for every scenario 
presented in this section since the placement and number of satellites in each case is the same and because the servicer 
only rendezvous with a failed satellite utilizing a phasing maneuver. 
Immediately when ISAM recycling capability was integrated into the infrastructure with the capability to 3D print 
plastics and composites at a 20% scavenge rate, there was approximately a  2% reduction in average resupply mass 
over 10 years compared to the non ISAM capable infrastructure. However, as the scavenge rate was increased from 
20%-100% when only plastic and composite manufacturing is available, there was only marginal increases in mass 
savings. This is most likely since the MTBF of module 1 is very high (approximately 11 years). Because there were 
very few failures of module 1 throughout the simulation, increasing the scavenge rate had minimal impact on the mass 
reduction since module 1 requires infrequent resupply in general. However, it is encouraging to see that as soon as 
recycling is integrated into the framework, even with limited capability, there is still mass savings. 
 When metal manufacturing and recycling was integrated, we could see a significant mass savings for the overall 
system. Initially, at a 20% scavenge rate for both technologies, there was a 15% reduction in mass. However, unlike 
the case before, as the scavenge rate increases, the mass savings also significantly increase. This is due to the fact that 





































frequent failure rate, increasing the amount of material that can be scavenged from the failed module greatly reduced 
the need for resupply of metal feedstock. When 100% of the metal and plastic feedstock can be recycled, there was an 
astounding 79% savings in resupply launch mass compared to the baseline infrastructure.  
The significance of integrating this final technology compared to the previous case was minimal for this particular 
architecture because of the infrequent failure rate of module 3 and the fact that each satellite only contains one module 
3. For the first technology examined, although module 1 has a higher MTBF, there are four of these modules per 
satellite. Thus, the amount of overall failures of module 1 is higher than module 3. Because of the lack of module 3 
presence in each satellite, the additional ability to manufacture and recycle material from module 3 yielded almost 
insignificant mass savings compared to the infrastructures previous ability. The difference in launch savings between 
the two evolution scenarios analyzed is driven more by the randomness in the simulations than the additional capability 
itself. 
Although this case study did not illustrate the mass savings benefits of the embedded electronics technology, the 
scope of the paper is focused more on the development of a tool to evaluate overall ISAM and recycling impact for 
OOS rather than the specific 3D printing technologies themselves. This tool has shown that having any recycling 
capability is significant when there is a relatively frequent amount of failures of a particular module. If future cases 
have increased amount of electronics aboard the satellite,  this model is flexible enough to be updated and evaluate 
the new design. Additionally, with recycling capability, it is reasonable to assume that design of the components within 
each module could become less reliable to save initial manufacturing cost due to the on-orbit serviceability of these 
modules. If this is the case, then as reliability decreases and the failure rate increases, the total amount of failures does 
also increase. The model could also be updated to reflect this scenario and new results could be obtained  
It is beneficial to understand the high level total launch mass over 10 years results presented above on a lower 
modular launch mass level, so we can validate the factors discussed above contributing to the results. The most 
significant launch savings case was picked and compared to the baseline case to best illustrate what is occurring at the 
modular level and how they are individually affecting the total launch mass. Table 7 presents modular and feedstock 






Scavenge Rate Baseline PM, 0% PM, 20% PM, 40% PM, 60% PM, 80% PM, 
100% 
Module 1 Launch 
Mass, kg 
231.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Module 2 Launch 
mass, kg 
2003.28 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Plastic/Composite 
Launch Mass, kg 
0 235.20 172.03 136.66 89.09 42.58 0 
Metal Launch mass, 
kg 
0 1878.72 1494.53 1154.59 778.27 375.22 0 
Total Mass for 
Module 1 and 
Module 2 
replacements, kg 
2234.64 2113.92 1666.56 1291.25 867.36 417.79 0 
Total Launch mass, 
kg 
2721.84 2767.44 2311.92 1893.17 1462.08 996.91 561.36 
 
The table above shows, at the module 1 and module 2 level, how the resupply launch mass decreases as the 
scavenge rate decreases. The resupply mass for module 3 and module 4 remains are not affected since their modules 
are not manufactured on orbit. Thus, as the resupply plastic/composite and metal feedstock for module 1 and module 
2 decreases as the scavenge rate increases, the total resupply launch mass over 10 years also decreases. 
Table 7 Module level results comparing baseline infrastructure to AM infrastructure with plastic/composite, 
metal (PM) ISAM and recycling capability 
28 
 
Table 7 also shows that launch mass savings only begins when recycling capability is introduced. In fact, Fig. 4 
shows that this is true for all ISAM/recycling technology cases. When ISAM capability is added to the infrastructure 
with a 0% scavenge rate, there is no reduction in total launch mass. In fact, we can see that basically the total resupply 
mass for module 1 and module 2 in the baseline infrastructure is just replaced by the total resupply plastic/composite 
and metal mass in the AM infrastructure. Along with resupply launch mass, our analysis established how the 
responsiveness in terms of average waiting time of the AM OOS infrastructure compares to the baseline infrastructure. 
Table 8 shows the average waiting time in hours for the  0% and 100% scavenge rate results of each technology. 
 
 
Scavenge Rate 0% 100% 








Table 8 shows that the scavenge rate does not affect the average waiting time of the infrastructure regardless of 
the scavenge rate. It is believed that the reason ISAM/recycling technology had no impact on the responsiveness of 
the infrastructure is because of the few number of satellites being managed within the servicing architecture. Only 
servicing five satellites leads to a relatively few number of total failures. Thus, the mothership depot never fully 
completely depletes its supply of a module or feedstock before the next resupply opportunity is available. Thus, the 
servicer is never required to wait for the mothership to be resupplied before it completes a service within both 
infrastructure cases. Investigation into the simulation data revealed that this was true. This fact naturally lead to the 
question of how the AM OOS infrastructure can decrease the responsiveness of the architecture if there are an increase 
in the total number of serviceable satellites, which is analyzed in the next subsection.  
 
Table 8 Average waiting time for baseline and AM infrastructures 
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Serviceable Satellites Sensitivity Analysis 
This section analyzes the sensitivity analysis of the metrics against the number of satellites. Increasing the number 
of satellites within the architecture increases the total number of failures of each module. The increase of these failures 
could possibly lead to mothership module supply depletion before the next resupply opportunity. This would increase 
the total waiting time of the infrastructure. However, with ISAM recycling capability, the depletion of the mothership 
supply would take a longer time. Thus, the AM infrastructure could be more responsive than the baseline infrastructure 
even with the added manufacturing time element. 
To answer this question, a particular ISAM technology capability was chosen and its responsiveness was compared 
to the baseline infrastructure. The technology integrated into the AM infrastructure was established as plastic and 
metal printing with a scavenge rate of 80%. This particular case was chosen due to its significant decrease in resupply 
launch mass seen in the previous analysis, which means this case depletes the mothership supply of modules at a much 
slower rate than the baseline case. 
Setting this particular case, simulations were run for both the baseline and AM architecture for 5, 10, 20, 30, and 
40 satellites. Again, each particular scenario was simulated fifty times over 10 years and the average waiting time for 
each servicing mission was calculated. The results of these simulations are shown in Fig. 5. 
 




 Figure 5 is also showing the 5th percentile (bottom bar) through 95th percentile (top bar) range. The 5th and 
95th percentile error bar represents the waiting time that is greater than only 5% and 95%of the total samples, 
respectively. This was utilized instead of reporting the standard deviation because as the number of satellites increased, 
a few outliers in the data caused by the cascading effects of launch failures showed up with enormous waiting times 
that made the standard deviation value not very useful. Instead, showing the middle 90% range of values allows for 
more reasonable and valuable comparison of the two infrastructures in terms of waiting times. 
As predicted, as the number of satellites increased, both the average waiting times in the baseline and the AM OOS 
increased significantly; however, for the same number of satellites, the AM capability within the infrastructure resulted 
in a much shorter response time than the baseline infrastructure. This can be explained as follows: as the number of 
satellites increases, there are instances within the baseline infrastructure where the servicer must wait for the 
mothership to be resupplied before the repair is completed. With scavenging capability, the mothership supply is not 
depleted as quickly and thus the average waiting time is much smaller. In addition, the 5th percentile to 95th percentile 
error bar range for the AM was much smaller than for the baseline case, which shows that the AM case has less 
variation in waiting time on a mission by mission basis. It can also be seen that the 95th percentile waiting time for the 
AM infrastructure is significantly smaller than the baseline 95th percentile. Thus, the higher servicing mission waiting 
times of the AM infrastructure are much shorter than the higher servicing waiting times of the no AM case.  
This analysis once again exemplified the possible benefits ISAM capability has on the servicing of modularized 
satellites.  The most significant benefits in implementing the AM/recycling capability into the infrastructure came 
when servicing 40 satellites, as seen in Fig. 5. With 40 serviceable satellites, the baseline infrastructure had an average 
waiting time of 444.8 hours, 5th percentile waiting time of 66.94 hours, and a 95th percentile waiting time 1120.6 hours. 
The AM architecture had an average waiting time of 276.91 hours, 5th percentile waiting time of 59.9 hours, and 95% 
waiting time 674.97 hours. This is an approximately 38% decrease in average waiting time, a similar 5th percentile 
waiting time, and a 40% decrease in 95th percentile waiting time. 
Next, the average total resupply launch mass over 10 years for each number of satellites scenario was analyzed to 
see if the increase in satellites impacted the AM benefits shown in the previous scavenge rate section. Figure 6 shows 
the average resupply launch mass over 10 years for 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40 satellites within both the baseline and AM 





Fig. 6 Average resupply launch mass over 10 years of AM vs. baseline architecture 
 As expected, the recycling capability of the AM infrastructure meant there was a significant decrease in the 
resupply launch mass compared to the baseline infrastructure. However, increasing the number of satellites had no 
effect on the relative resupply launch mass. For each satellite case, there was approximately a 60% reduction in 
required launch mass from the baseline to the AM architecture. Finally, because the number of satellites increased in 
this analysis, the average propellant consumption for each case will be different than stated in section A. Table 9 
shows the average propellant mass per mission and its standard deviation for both the baseline and AM OOS cases 






































Table 9 Servicer mission propellant consumption for varying satellites in baseline and AM architectures 
















































 Because there are an increased number of satellites, there is a higher likelihood of longer servicer missions, which 
leads to higher propellant consumption and more variability in propellant consumption mission to mission. Also, the 
average propellant mass difference between the baseline and AM architectures is negligible for each satellite case. 
This confirms the initial remarks that the propellant consumption is unaffected by the different architectures and is 







CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed and developed an integrated simulation framework to evaluate the impact that ISAM 
technology for a permanent OOS infrastructure that responds to random failures of the modularized satellites 
distributed over an orbit. The developed integrated simulation framework considers the failure of satellite components, 
replacement of the modules, AM/scavenging of modules, and resupply of the mothership platform. The simulation 
results validated the possible benefits of ISAM technology in terms of resupply launch mass and waiting time before 
service (i.e., responsiveness).  
Two important findings can be concluded in evaluating ISAM for servicing of modularized satellites. First, with 
the ability to manufacture replacement modules on orbit, the required mass supply from Earth can be reduced 
considerably. Second, the on-demand nature and scavenging abilities of the AM OOS infrastructure significantly 
increase the serviceability of the infrastructure as more satellites are added.  
It is the hope that based on these results, the in-space manufacturing industry begins researching and developing 
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